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Does same-sex marriage show Church and state cannot sing from the same hymn sheet? 
Abstract 
One important conflict between Church and state in which there is much contemporary interest 
centres on same-sex marriage. More and more states are reforming marriage law to allow for same-
sex marriage in the secular context. The extension of equal marriage from the secular to the 
religious context, however, remains fraught. 
We respond to three arguments against same-sex marriage within religious contexts. The first says 
that same-sex relationships fail to realise the value of marriage because they do not lead to 
procreation. The second says that the attitudes expressed in a religious text justify not 
accommodating same-sex marriage. The third says that making marriage available to same-sex 
couples induces a change in the meaning of ‘marriage’. We argue that none of these arguments 
succeeds. Religious representatives should, if they are open to reasons (see §3), endorse same-sex 
marriage. 
Nevertheless, we argue that the state should allow individuals who perform religious marriages the 
option of declining to marry same-sex couples. This is because of the special role of sincerity in 
performing a marriage. The requirement of sincerity distinguishes the case of marriage from cases 
where a couple’s right to equality of opportunity is violated, e.g. where an hotelier refuses a room to 
a couple because they are of the same sex. Representatives of a religion who believe that marriage is 
unsuitable for same-sex couples, however poor their arguments, are incapable of performing same-
sex marriages. In that case, they should not be subject to state sanctions for refusing to marry a 
same-sex couple. 
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1. Same-sex marriage in secular and religious contexts 
One important conflict between Church and state which has received much contemporary interest 
centres on same-sex marriage. There is some remaining opposition to same-sex marriage in the 
secular context, but more and more states are reforming marriage law to allow for it. The question 
of the extension of equal marriage from the secular to the religious context, however, remains 
fraught. How should a state which allows secular marriage between same-sex partners respond to 
representatives of religious institutions who refuse to perform religious marriage ceremonies for 
partners of the same sex? 
We concentrate on two questions, and the relations between them. One is whether there is any 
good argument against same-sex marriage within religious contexts. We address three influential 
candidates, and argue that none succeeds. The other is how the state should legislate on same-sex 
marriage in religious contexts. If the arguments against same-sex marriage in such contexts are poor, 
should the state require the Church to extend its marriage practices to couples of the same sex? If 
not, why not? We argue that while representatives of religions should endorse same-sex marriage, 
the requirements for performing a marriage mean that those who do not should be allowed the 
opportunity to decline to marry same-sex couples on the basis of their sex, despite the fact that their 
reasons are likely to be bad ones. 
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1.1 The nature of marriage 
Persons may make any number of commitments to each other. To marry is to commit to upholding 
certain standards of behaviour (norms) which regulate the relationship in certain ways from that 
point forward. 
Marriage ceremonies, being a public declaration of that commitment, serve to communicate that 
commitment to others. As such, they set up an expectation in others that those who have made a 
commitment by means of marriage subscribe to certain norms. This communicative function is also 
served by any subsequent wearing of rings, changing of names and titles, and so on. 
For the purposes of our discussion, we can leave open whether marriage is best seen primarily as a 
matter of love and friendship or as a politico-economic relationship. All we need to note is that the 
expectation is that a marriage will include many of these features to a lesser or greater degree. Such 
relationships typically involve: the creation of a family unit; the creation of new family members (by 
means of a joint biological effort or otherwise); relations of dependence and of authority amongst 
those members; the subsequent creation of obligations towards members (e.g. of care, or of sexual 
exclusivity between the parents); expectations of favourable treatment (e.g. concerning which 
person(s) will inherit another person’s assets), and a sharing of emotional and economic resources 
and burdens to various degrees across the lifetimes of the members. 
Much time, effort and money is invested by those constructing family units (even by those who 
choose not to create any more family members); hence much of the reason why there is an 
expectation that those who marry have committed to a long-term relationship. Ideally, the benefits 
will more than match the costs of marriage. The long-term investment required, together with the 
worthwhile benefits received, is the incentive to make the family units successful and thus stable. 
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If the widespread belief is true that stable families make for stable societies, society has an interest 
in promoting marriage. So society offers additional support to that found within the family unit, and 
thus further incentivizes those who wish to take on a commitment to marry. 
If marriage is good for those who are married and is believed to make a positive contribution to 
society, then withholding the opportunity to marry from certain couples risks disadvantaging them 
and barring them from (at least being credited with) making such positive contributions to society. 
(Notice that even those who deny that marriage makes positive contributions can agree that couples 
who are disallowed marriage are disallowed the opportunity of being credited with contributing.) 
Thus equality of opportunity across members of society provides a reason for making marriage 
available to couples regardless of whether the partners are of the same sex as one another, or are of 
different sexes. 
 
1.2 A crucial first move to make in debates concerning same-sex marriage 
Issue concerning same-sex marriage are often approached using the label ‘gay marriage’. This use of 
the adjective ‘gay’ is widespread both among those who are for and those who are against same-sex 
marriage. The label ‘gay marriage’ is inappropriate because it suggests the wrong conceptual 
resources for understanding what the fundamental issues are. Why? First, because ‘gay marriage’ 
clearly does not cover all of the orientations a person pursuing a same-sex marriage might have. 
Whether the opportunity for same-sex marriage is available impacts as much on e.g. some bisexual 
persons, some persons who identify as queer and not as gay, and so on.1 
                                                          
1
 And on some heterosexual persons, since it is not as if sexual or romantic attraction is a requirement of a 
marital relationship. It is not too hard to imagine cases where a heterosexual person would have other reasons 
to marry someone they were not sexually or romantically attracted to (whether of the same or a different sex). 
But we need not hinge our argument on such cases. 
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Second, because gay marriage has been legal for as long as straight marriage. The reason is this. Gay 
persons do marry and are allowed to marry, so long as it is a marriage with someone of the opposite 
sex. Thus, the common claim that the restricted availability of marriage is unjust because it unfairly 
discriminates on the basis of sexuality is strictly speaking false. Rather, the injustice lies in unfairly 
discriminating against those who wish to enjoy the benefits of marriage with someone of the same 
sex. 
Thus, in order to understand what is at issue, we must stop thinking of the debate in terms of ‘gay’ 
or ‘straight’ marriage. That sets up a conceptual confusion from the start. The expression ‘gay 
marriage’ frames the debate in a way that obscures which considerations should be brought to bear 
in arriving at a conclusion. Of course, there are gay persons who will be able to enter into overdue 
same-sex marriages once this is legal (just as there are plenty of persons who are not gay who will be 
able to enter into such overdue marriages). But the issue of same-sex marriage is not a gay rights 
issue. It is a human rights issue. It is an issue concerning the demands of equality and fair treatment 
of humans (whatever their sexual orientation). For these reasons, we shall use the less misleading 
term ‘same-sex marriage’ when we talk about marriages between persons of the same sex.2 
 
1.3 Same-sex civil marriage ceremonies only? 
Although opposition remains to same-sex marriages even in the civil context, it is often within the 
religious context that opposition has consequences for the practical possibility of marrying someone 
of one’s own sex. In the UK, for example, much of the public debate over same-sex marriage centres 
                                                          
2
 We use the expression ‘equal marriage’ to indicate the availability of marriage both to couples of the same 
sex and to couples of opposite sexes. By ‘religious marriages’ and ‘civil/secular marriages’ we mean marriages 
performed in religious and in civil/secular contexts, respectively. 
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on whether same-sex marriage should be conducted within religious institutions.3 Whilst marriage 
has recently been legalised both for couples of different sexes and for couples of the same sex 
within the civil context in the UK, same-sex marriage is not legally possible within the Church of 
England or Church in Wales, and representatives of other religious bodies are legally able to perform 
same-sex marriages only if that body officially ‘opts in’ to the provision of same-sex marriages. 
This illustrates that if the state (whether the UK or another state) is not to require the Church to 
extend its marriage practices to couples of the same sex, then in legislating on same-sex marriage in 
religious contexts the state might employ one of two strategies: 
(1) Legally disallow same-sex marriage within certain religions. 
(2) Allow individuals who perform religious marriages the option of declining to marry same-sex 
couples.4 
                                                          
3
 Note that our focus in this paper is on the philosophical issues which arise for states which do support equal 
marriage in some contexts (e.g. the civil context), or which are moving towards such a position. There are 
other types of state. One interesting case is those where state policy opposes same-sex marriage (in any 
context) precisely because of the influence of a religious institution on the very structure and values of the 
state. We do not propose to consider, here, the broader issue of the extent to which it is appropriate for state 
policy to be determined directly by a religious institution. But note that insofar as the arguments given against 
same-sex marriage by a religious institution are poor, they are poor justification for state opposition to same-
sex marriage in general in such societies. 
4
 In the UK, this is the option represented by the opportunity for a religious body to ‘opt in’ to the provision of 
same-sex marriage. Opting in constitutes an allowance that representatives can choose to marry couples of 
the same sex, rather than a prescription to representatives to do so. The fact that same-sex marriage remains 
illegal within the Church of England and Church in Wales is a result of those organisations wishing not to 
conduct marriage ceremonies for same-sex couples together with particular legal features of those 
organisations which other religious institutions in the UK do not share. 
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There is a problem with strategy (1). It does not adequately address the potential conflict of rights at 
issue. This conflict is between the right to equality of opportunity for same-sex couples, and the right 
to freely express one’s religious beliefs (e.g. that marriage is suitable only for opposite-sex couples). 
Strategy (1) does not provide a framework for navigating this conflict. Rather, it removes any 
opportunity for navigating the conflict. Under strategy (1), when a representative of a religion does 
not marry a couple of the same sex, this will not be because they have chosen free expression of 
their beliefs over equality of opportunity. No such choice will be needed, nor will it be possible. 
While strategy (1) may deliver results which accord with certain religious beliefs of some persons, 
making it legally impossible to act otherwise does not, in our view, amount to the state giving 
representatives of the Church freedom of expression of such beliefs.  
Further problems with strategy (1) can be brought out by considering those cases of religious beliefs 
the expression of which is actively inhibited by making same-sex marriage illegal within a religion. It 
may be an important part of a particular representative’s religious outlook that same-sex 
partnerships can be legitimate candidates for religious marriage. Indeed, it often is – one reason for 
disagreement on the issue within a religion is that some representatives see in potential same-sex 
marriages the realisation of the same values which they endorse through performing opposite-sex 
marriages. It is clear that strategy (1) conflicts with the freedom to express these religious beliefs. 
Moreover, it does so whilst making no gain for the supposed other side of the conflict of rights (the 
right to equality of opportunity for couples regardless of their sexes). 
Thus, freedom of expression of religious belief is an argument for strategy (2) but against strategy 
(1). (Whether strategy (2) conflicts with the right to equal opportunities is not obvious – we pursue 
this question further in §5.) Strategy (2) raises a practical concern of legal vulnerability of 
representatives who refuse to marry a couple on grounds of their being of the same sex (voiced in 
e.g. the Church of England’s response to the UK consultation on same-sex marriage). The concern is 
8 
 
that if the option of marrying a same-sex couple is available but refused by the individual, the 
individual is at risk of accusations of unfair discrimination and, thus, of potential prosecution.  
This is a concern only for those religious representatives who refuse to perform same-sex marriages. 
So one question is whether anybody should find themselves in this position. The next stage of our 
argument is to show that such persons have no good grounds for refusal. There is no good reason to 
think that same-sex marriage is incompatible with the grounds religious individuals put forward for 
supporting marriage. 
We shall address three influential lines of argument against same-sex marriage within religious 
contexts. The procreative argument says that same-sex sexual relationships fail to realise the value 
of marriage because they do not lead to procreation. The argument from textual interpretation says 
that the attitudes expressed in a religious text provide reason not to accommodate same-sex 
marriage within the religion in question. The argument from meaning says that marriage should not 
be made available to same-sex couples because this induces a change in the meaning of ‘marriage’. 
 
2. The procreative argument 
The procreative argument says that same-sex sexual activity cannot be procreative, and so cannot 
serve the formation of a family through loving reproduction within the marriage. We shall call this 
the ‘conservative’ approach. We propose two responses. The first develops the observation that 
some opposite-sex couples cannot engage in sexual acts which are procreative; the second argues 
that same-sex couples can, in any case, procreate.    
One of the most fully-developed conservative views is that of John Finnis (Finnis 1993). His argument 
is as follows. Persons should not use each other as instruments for the purpose of sexual 
gratification. The only way in which sexual activity can avoid this charge is if it takes place within 
marriage. This is because marriage is intelligible as a common good: it has the ‘double blessing’ of 
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friendship and procreation. Same-sex sexual activity does not have this intelligible common good 
and thus amounts instead to worthless self-gratification. Thus Finnis’s conservative argument seeks 
to establish that same-sex sexual activity is starkly different from marital sex. 
One thought at play in Finnis’s argument is that marriage itself provides a framework within which 
sexual activity can be given a point. This may be correct. But that alone tells us nothing about sexual 
activity with a person of one’s own sex. First, extending the institution of marriage to include same-
sex couples would seemingly give them access to the point of sex which marriage provides. Second, 
there are aspects of sexual activity which are clearly of value and apparently do not rely on marriage, 
such as engaging in pleasurable activities with other persons, experiencing intimacy, and expressing 
love. 
Thus Finnis’s view appears to rest on the thought that there is some deep link between the 
components of the ‘double blessing’ found in marriage; that is, between procreation and friendship. 
Without the possibility of procreation, a sexual act cannot be a realisation of the friendship between 
the couple; on the contrary, it can only be for self-gratification. Those in same-sex relationships 
cannot succeed in expressing genuine friendship (including loving intimacy) through their sexual 
acts, because such acts cannot result in procreation. As such, those involved in the sexual act can 
only thereby be using the other as a means to their own self-gratification. The view Finnis arrives at 
is that the goods of marriage can only be realised where procreation is possible. This would seem to 
make marriage no place for same-sex sexual activity. 
The strongest case against the argument, and against any similar conservative argument, is to be 
built by taking it on its own terms. 
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2.1 The ‘double standards’ response 
We can begin by drawing out the consequences of a conservative position for sexual activity 
between married couples (young or old) who are infertile. Most conservatives such as Finnis do not 
wish to label sexual acts between such couples as cases of using the other for worthless self-
gratification. Neither do those who oppose same-sex marriage on procreative grounds endorse 
denying marriage to infertile or post-menopausal persons. 
This is the ‘double standards’ response, which says that advocates of the procreative argument 
unfairly apply double standards when considering same-sex and infertile opposite-sex couples. Since 
the conservative appeal to procreation does not distinguish sexual acts between couples one or 
more of whom is infertile from sexual acts between couples of the same sex, the conservative 
cannot take the latter to be worthless self-gratification, given that they do not say this of the former. 
The conservative may try to respond by appealing to biological differences between same-sex sexual 
activity and opposite-sex sexual activity between infertile persons. For example, the two might 
involve different collections of genitalia. If these biological differences are to further the 
conservative’s argument, they must be shown to have some relevance to procreation. Thus the 
conservative might say that procreation is a possibility for the infertile opposite-sex couple in a way 
it is not for the same-sex couple. Even if some particular coupling of a man and a woman cannot lead 
to procreation, the type of act they can engage in (penetration of a vagina by a penis) is the same 
type of act which can be procreative in other, fertile, couplings. Perhaps this is what Finnis has in 
mind when he asserts that ‘the orgasmic union of the reproductive organs of husband and wife 
really unites them biologically’ (Finnis 1993, 136). This, the conservative might say, means that 
same-sex sexual activity is somehow further from being procreative than is infertile opposite-sex 
sexual activity. 
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This argument does not stand up to scrutiny. It relies on the resemblance between certain sexual 
acts which can be engaged in by an infertile opposite-sex couple and sexual acts which can lead to 
procreation in a fertile opposite-sex couple.5 But whilst these acts do resemble each other in many 
ways, they do not resemble each other in the crucial respect. One can lead to procreation, and the 
other cannot. It is not clear why any other resemblance should compensate for this, when what is 
crucial to conservative sexual morality is the possibility of procreation, and that is precisely the 
respect in which the acts differ. 
The only option left for the conservative is to hold that sexual activity between infertile opposite-sex 
couples – including infertile opposite-sex married couples – has the same ethical status as sexual 
activity between persons of the same sex. Those conservatives who cannot swallow the conclusion 
that opposite-sex infertility is a barrier to rightful marriage must accept our conclusion instead: 
whether same-sex sexual activity is procreative shows nothing about its aptness to realise the goods 
of marriage. 
It is worth also dealing with a further charge Finnis makes against same-sex sexual activity: that in 
not being procreative it ‘disposes the participants to an abdication of responsibility for the future of 
humankind’ (Finnis 1993, 137). It is not obvious that we should concede to Finnis that present 
persons do have such a responsibility for the future of humankind. But let us assume this for the 
sake of argument. First, it is not clear why we should all need to produce children in order to take 
responsibility for the future of humankind, so long as we do enough of it collectively to avoid dying 
out. Second, the argument from responsibility for the future is not an argument against same-sex 
sexual acts themselves. It is, at best, an argument that those who engage in same-sex sexual acts 
                                                          
5
 Of course, either couple might choose not to engage in such acts anyway, perhaps preferring others. So far as 
activities such as oral sex and anal sex are concerned, this particular conservative argument makes no ethical 
distinction between engaging in them with a person of the opposite sex and engaging in them with a person of 
the same sex. 
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should take care to not let this stop them engaging in opposite-sex sexual acts too. (That conclusion 
is also a bad one, but the point is that even if it were correct that would not tell against same-sex 
sexual activities in their own right.) Third, no reason is offered for believing that just because a 
couple is not going to add to the numbers in future generations, neither will they be prone to take 
responsibility for any aspect of the welfare of future generations. Fourth, couples who have children 
without reproducing, as in the case of adoption, take on the same responsibilities for the lives and 
future contributions of particular individuals as are taken on when a couple produces a child 
biologically. Fifth – and this brings us to the next step of our argument – it is, in any case, perfectly 
possible for same-sex couples to procreate. 
 
2.2 Same-sex procreation 
The procreative argument is underpinned by an assumption that, for a couple to procreate, they 
must be of different sexes. For example, two men cannot procreate since they have, between them, 
no ovaries, no ova and no uterus. We think this assumption is wrong, and can be corrected by a 
proper understanding of reproduction. 
There is a reading of ‘reproduce’ or ‘procreate’ on which it is something same-sex couples cannot 
do. This reading construes reproduction narrowly, as a particular biological process. Stages of this 
process include sperm being placed into the woman’s body by ejaculation, fertilisation taking place 
near the womb, and the child developing in a way determined by the genetics of the couple who are 
to be the parents. But this reading is too narrow, both too narrow for the conservative’s purposes 
and too narrow to reflect the focus of much of our everyday talk about procreating. This is because it 
fails to cohere with the sense of the related word ‘family’, and disregards the interpersonal 
characteristics of a reproductive process. 
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What we are interested in when we talk about somebody’s starting or having a family is many 
things, not limited to genetic and biological links between the family-members. We do not have to 
consider alternative reproductive technologies in order to see this. Consider an opposite-sex couple 
who decide to add to their family and go about it through having sex without contraception. The 
formation of the family is not just biological, but interpersonal, including elements such as: attitudes 
of persons to one another (the man trusts the woman to raise a child he will love); decisions made 
(the parents make plans with the arrival of a child in mind); intentions (the couple deliberately do 
those things which will – they hope – result in conception); desires (the woman wants the man to 
raise her child), and reasons for action (the couple take steps to conceive because they want to have 
a child together; they make adjustments to their lifestyle in order to accommodate the needs of a 
new family member). Recall, too, the mutual expectations and other interpersonal attitudes 
characteristic of family which we began to catalogue in §1.1. 
The defender of the procreative argument is concerned with who is able to form families. 
‘Reproduction’, understood in a way which matches what we mean by ‘family’, is a matter not 
merely of bare biological processes, but of biological processes which are initiated for certain 
distinctive interpersonal reasons. Thus procreating involves a wide network of interpersonal 
attitudes and actions as well as biological processes. The crux of our argument against the 
conservative will be that these interpersonal elements allow for procreation between same-sex 
partners. 
Of course, there are cases of procreation when some, even many, interpersonal elements are 
missing, such as some of the cases where a child results from casual sex. But these are not the cases 
the typical conservative wants to take as aspirational. More importantly, the fact that procreation 
can sometimes involve less of the interpersonal does not at all establish that the elements present in 
these cases are definitive of what procreation is. Rather, just as reproduction can take place with 
certain interpersonal elements missing, it can also take place without involving exactly those 
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biological processes which take place when an opposite-sex couple conceives through unprotected 
sex. 
By taking reproduction through intercourse between a fertile man and fertile woman to be the 
paradigm (or even the only) case of reproduction, we overinflate the importance of a particular 
biological process in procreation. Reminding ourselves of the social and interpersonal aspects of 
reproduction allows for flexibility in what role is played by biology in an individual reproductive 
process. For example, some opposite-sex reproductive processes involve both parents’ genetics, but 
conception happens outside sex. Some opposite-sex couples acquire children through a process 
whose biological element involves only one parent’s genetics. The mother of the family may carry a 
baby who originates genetically from an egg donor. Fertilisation may not happen within the 
mother’s womb. Or the baby may not even grow within her womb. This does not mean the 
reproductive process does not involve both parents. The mother is involved in the process because 
its interpersonal elements, such as the decisions taken and the reasons for taking them, are based 
on her as well as her male partner (who, let us suppose for simplicity, is also the child’s biological 
father). 
Same-sex reproductive processes, like opposite-sex reproductive processes, involve biology within 
an interpersonal setting. For example, female partners might use donor sperm together with ova 
and a womb provided by the couple; male partners might provide sperm to fertilise a donor egg to 
be carried by a surrogate mother. In some cases of procreation (same-sex or opposite-sex) the 
familial parents oversee a biological process involving two distinct genetic parents, neither of whom 
is part of the couple. It remains the case that the interpersonal significance of the biological process 
centres on the couple (the familial parents), and intimately so. This makes it their reproductive 
process, just as much as sex between a fertile husband and wife is that couple’s reproductive 
process. 
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Biological elements of same-sex reproduction are integrated with interpersonal elements, as with 
opposite-sex reproduction. Biological processes are dependent on interpersonal reasons, decisions, 
attitudes, and so on. This is what we should expect from paradigm cases of reproduction insofar as it 
is family, not merely biology, that we are interested in. We can illustrate the point by considering 
counterfactuals about same-sex reproductive processes. These counterfactuals will also reveal the 
dependence of the biological process on both partners – even if only one partner, or neither partner, 
is a genetic parent. For example: Martha would not have become pregnant had it not been for the 
life she was living with, the attitudes she had towards, and the decisions she made with, her partner 
Jessica; Katrina would not have given birth to that baby had she not been a surrogate mother for 
John and Lewis, and would not have been asked to be a surrogate mother for John and Lewis had 
they not had certain attitudes towards having and raising a child together. 
Note that in many cases there will even be indirect counterfactual dependence of the biological 
process on the couple’s sexual acts together (though it should be clear from the discussion so far 
that we do not take this to be in any way a requirement of reproduction). Suppose it is partly in their 
sexual encounters together that Laura and Amy acquire the trust, expectations, hopes and desires 
which characterise their decision to have children together. Then it may be that, for example, the 
harvesting of Laura’s eggs, the fertilisation of an egg with donor sperm, the implantation of the egg 
in Laura’s womb, and the consequent birth of Laura and Amy’s child is counterfactually and causally 
dependent on Laura and Amy’s earlier sexual encounters. 
Given these considerations, the claim that two people of the same sex cannot procreate is far too 
crude. Properly understood, the notion of procreation is rich enough to characterise interactions 
between persons of the same sex as procreative. Since same-sex couples can procreate, there is no 
procreative argument against same-sex relationships, and thus no argument against same-sex 
marriage can be given on this basis. 
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Indeed, the value which the procreative objection places on procreation within marriage, together 
with the possibility of same-sex reproduction, tells in favour of same-sex marriage within both civil 
and religious contexts. Since partners of the same sex are among the couplings which can and do 
procreate, marriage is appropriate for persons of the same sex. 
Insofar as a religious attitude to marriage is underpinned by the view that marriage is connected to 
the possibility of procreation, the religious attitude should be that same-sex marriage is a good 
thing. Indeed, it may be that this endorsement of same-sex marriage should be all the stronger for 
the fact that same-sex procreation is already happening outside the framework of marriage. If 
marriage is the proper home of procreation, provision should be made to bring cases of procreation 
within the framework of marriage – rather than encouraging procreation to remain outside 
marriage. 
The procreative argument thus provides no defensible reason for a representative of a religion to 
oppose same-sex marriage, nor to decline to perform same-sex marriages themselves. In fact, a 
religious representative who initially endorsed the procreative argument should take our discussion 
as a reason to welcome same-sex marriage. In that case, withholding marriage from persons of the 
same sex in the religious context would not freely express the religious beliefs such a person ought 
to have. 
 
3. The argument from textual interpretation 
The failure of the procreative argument is also important to the prospects of another line of 
argument. It is sometimes argued that a religious text indicates attitudes which are in conflict with 
same-sex marriage, and that this is a reason against extending equal marriage into religious 
contexts. Appeals to (apparent) opposition to same-sex relationships within a text are often 
supplemented with a rationale for the opposition – that is, a reason why the text, or its source, 
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should oppose same-sex relationships. Thus textual arguments often come back to the procreative 
argument. For example, a defender of the argument from textual interpretation might claim that the 
Bible opposes same-sex relationships because it is sensitive to their procreative difference from 
opposite-sex relationships. 
This illustrates a plausible principle of charity for the interpretation of texts – we should attribute 
attitudes to texts (or their implied authors) on the basis of a reason for such attitudes being held. 
Without such reasons, arguments from textual interpretation are vulnerable to defeat from better 
interpretations. There are all kinds of ways to avoid attributing irrational or strange attitudes to texts 
when we come across passages which seem incoherent or mistaken. Consider the alternative 
interpretations which could be offered by somebody who – like us – thinks that opposition to same-
sex relationships is radically mistaken and morally misguided. Rather than attribute radically 
mistaken attitudes to a text, charity dictates that we should posit alternatives. For example, we 
might treat any apparent opposition as really being opposition to other features of same-sex activity 
(perhaps some hygiene risks for males contemporaneous with the text, for example). Or we might 
deal with a passage by positing metaphor, or some other device which allows us to distinguish what 
the text commits to from what appears to be stated. Or, if the text is supposed to express the 
attitudes of a deity, we can suppose that whatever human scribe has had the difficult task of 
translating and setting down these attitudes has misconstrued what the deity really thinks. In short, 
there are many more charitable approaches than to treat the text as seriously morally misguided. 
In order to combat such rival interpretations, the defender of an argument against same-sex 
marriage from textual interpretation must be able to show that to attribute opposition to same-sex 
relationships to the text is not to attribute morally misguided attitudes. For this, they need an 
argument to the effect that it is not misguided to oppose same-sex relationships. And the most 
influential candidate – the procreative argument – fails to achieve this. 
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The defender of the argument from textual interpretation might attempt to escape this problem by 
rejecting the principle of charity as a principle for the interpretation of the religious text in question. 
On this view, interpretations need not incorporate any attempt to treat attitudes expressed in the 
text as stemming from appreciable reasons. This view, if plausible, would allow the defender of the 
argument from textual interpretation to deny that they need support from another argument giving 
independent reasons to oppose same-sex marriage or same-sex relationships. 
The first task for this defence is to explain why they reject the principle of charity, in a way which is 
not an ad hoc response to the problems charity poses for them. But even if this can be done, there 
are reasons to doubt that textual interpretations which are divorced from the principle of charity can 
establish what their proponents need them to. 
For the question is whether, in that case, the attitudes expressed in the text should be taken to 
reflect the beliefs of any agent the objector takes as a moral guide (such as God). This is because, as 
Donald Davidson has argued (see, e.g. (Davidson 1984)), we do apply a principle of charity in belief-
attribution, and in attribution of mental states more generally. Charity to God (for example) suggests 
that we should take God’s attitudes to be informed by reasons for having those attitudes. In the 
absence of independent grounds for charitably attributing to God opposition to same-sex 
relationships, the interpretation which says such attitudes are expressed by (e.g.) the Bible simply 
leaves it unclear why we should maintain that the Bible reflects the attitudes of God on this point. 
One way of escaping this problem is to deny that the principle of charity in mental-state attribution 
applies to attributions of mental states to (e.g.) God. This version of the argument from textual 
interpretation goes like this: the Bible (for example) says that sexual activity between men (or 
whatever) is wrong. So God must think sexual activity between men is wrong, because that is what 
the Bible says. And what God thinks is wrong is wrong. So sexual activity between men is wrong. 
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At this point it is useful to recall a version of the famous Euthyphro dilemma. The dilemma is this: 
either the morally good is morally good because God approves of it (in which case, what makes 
God’s approval non-arbitrary and a worthwhile guide?) or God approves of the morally good 
because it is morally good (in which case, there are independent grounds for doing some things and 
not others, and God’s judgement becomes an apparently redundant epiphenomenon). The 
argument from textual interpretation which we are now considering takes the first horn of the 
dilemma. God’s attitudes determine what is good, rather than responding to what is good. Contrast 
the results we get when we apply a principle of charity in attributing attitudes to same-sex 
relationships to God. In this case, we suppose that God’s attitudes are based on, and thus reflect, 
independent facts or arguments concerning the nature of same-sex relationships. Thus, in the 
absence of facts or arguments which suggest that same-sex relationships are objectionable, we 
should resist attributing disapproval to God. So adopting charity leaves us on the second horn of the 
dilemma, while abandoning it leaves us on the first. Whether there are ways to defend the moral 
importance of God’s judgement on the second horn is not our concern here. What we wish to show 
is that ending up on the first horn makes the argument from textual interpretation impotent in the 
debate over extending equal marriage to religious contexts. 
What the argument from textual interpretation is left saying, at this point, is that it is simply in virtue 
of opposition to same-sex relationships being (supposedly) God’s attitude that this attitude should 
guide our moral decision-making over the treatment of same-sex relationships. But then the 
question is why God’s moral judgements should inform ours. Persons work within a moral 
framework where persons are expected to have their attitudes for reasons, and given that the 
argument resists applying this framework to God, it is hard to see how God’s moral judgements 
could possibly have any relevance for our moral judgements. 
At this stage, the only move the defender of the argument from textual interpretation can make is to 
attempt to place proper human moral judgements outside the normal framework of reasons, too, 
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saying that the only reason for which a human should make a particular moral judgement is simply 
that in making this particular judgement, he or she is making the same judgement as God. On this 
view, other apparent reasons we might have for forming moral judgements of acts – such as 
discernment of harm or of lack of harm, or coherence with other aspects of one’s moral outlook 
(such as what character traits are thought to be valuable in a person) – are not real reasons at all. 
Neither is a belief in the moral expertise of the source of a moral prescription – that is, the defender 
of the argument from textual interpretation cannot even say that we follow God’s judgements 
because we have grounds to trust God’s expert judgement. For moral expertise is, in turn, 
ascertained partly in terms of how accurate we take somebody’s moral judgements to be, and this 
decision is based on whether we think those judgements stem from reasons we could appreciate. On 
the view under consideration, this is not a measure of expertise which can meaningfully be applied 
to God. 
This position is theoretically possible. Indeed, resistance to applying the principle of charity to God’s 
judgements, together with the attempt to divorce our own judgements from reasons other than 
replicating God’s judgements, may well be an aspect of what some people mean when they talk 
about the distinctive epistemological state of ‘faith’. But the position is dialectically weak, since it 
does not allow the defender of the argument from textual interpretation to interact fruitfully in the 
public realm of moral discussion and disagreement, whether concerning same-sex marriage or 
anything else. For this discussion and disagreement does work within the framework which the 
argument from textual interpretation has ended up rejecting. We do look for reasons, ones we can 
make sense of, when attributing attitudes to others. 
This may help to explain why debates on state policy in which the Church is represented sometimes 
reach stalemate. Those who endorse a principle of charity in attitude-attribution to others expect 
others to have reasons for their attitudes – and, by the same token, to change their attitudes in 
response to the availability or unavailability of reasons. Thus we might expect that somebody’s 
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opposition to same-sex marriage can in principle be affected by, for example, pointing out that 
same-sex relationships are no different from opposite-sex relationships in their capacity to foster 
trust, love, stable families, pleasure, equality, respect, and so on. Or by pointing out that nobody is 
harmed by the existence of same-sex couples. When somebody does not respond to these reasons, 
this might be because they deem them irrelevant, through adopting the view of moral judgement 
we have sketched. 
Of course, not all representatives or members of religions take this view of moral judgement. But the 
fact that some do explains why consultations on state policies which invoke religious perspectives on 
issues regarded as ‘moral’ do not necessarily make useful progress. Arguments from a perspective 
which operates with one framework of attitude-attribution (as secular perspectives do) will not be 
motivating for those who operate with a different framework of attitude-attribution (as some 
religious perspectives might). The fact that this difference of frameworks is philosophically complex 
and may be hard for either side to diagnose will likely make productive discussion between the state 
and the Church in such situations even harder. 
In sum, this version of the argument from textual interpretation ends up in a very weak position. 
Because it uses a framework of moral guidance which does not characterise human moral debate 
and decision-making at large, its defender is rendered impotent when attempting to enforce their 
own moral outlook within the scope of this debate and decision-making. This version of the 
argument is powerless in a way the original version – which attempted to find reasons for the text to 
express certain attitudes – is not. The original version, on the other hand, is hostage to the success 
of arguments that there is such a reason – such as the procreative argument. Since we think these 
arguments fail too, no version of the argument from textual interpretation is a good argument 
against same-sex marriage. Thus no version of the argument successfully establishes the conclusion 
that the state should allow, in any context, for the withholding of marriage from same-sex couples. 
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4. The argument from meaning 
In the UK at least, one of the objections to same-sex marriage voiced most often is that extending 
marriage to couples of the same sex changes the meaning of ‘marriage’ by redefining the institution, 
and that this change of meaning is illegitimate. How we respond to this argument will depend on 
whether we agree with its assumption that making marriage available to couples of the same sex 
induces a change of meaning. 
One response is to reject that assumption, saying that it confuses the question of what ‘marriage’ 
means with the question of who is married. It is true that the extension of the term ‘married couple’ 
will be different before and after equal marriage legislation within a given state. But the mere fact 
that the extension of ‘married couple’ was once coincident with the extension of ‘opposite-sex 
married couple’ does not necessarily establish that being of opposite sexes is, or has ever been, part 
of what it is to be married. To avoid begging the question, the defender of the argument from 
meaning must at least be able to provide evidence that the extension of ‘married’ is necessarily 
limited in the ways it has been historically, such that removing the limitation would be to stop using 
the original term. 
The defender of the argument from meaning might respond that the facts about meaning are 
determined solely by what the institution has been historically, and historically it has been an 
institution open only to opposite-sex couples. But this fails to distinguish between the definition of 
marriage and the regulations on marriage. 
Recognising the distinction between definition and regulation is, we think, seriously damaging to any 
claim that allowing persons of the same sex to marry changes the meaning of ‘marriage’. Consider 
an analogy. Suppose it is a regulation that only men can play professional Association football (i.e. 
soccer), and that this regulation is then relaxed so that women can play too. We would not say that 
the players are not playing football. The meaning of ‘football’ has not changed, but rather football 
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(the same game) is being regulated differently. Some traditionalists may not like the change in 
regulation, but it would be a confusion for them to object that there is no longer any such game as 
football, and that what we mean by ‘football’ these days is something else. 
Similarly, one institution of marriage can be regulated in different ways over time. Before the 
introduction of equal marriage, it is a regulation in a state that marriage takes place between a man 
and a woman. Given this regulation, something can only be marriage if it takes place between a man 
and a woman. So the extension of ‘married’ cannot include same-sex couples; but this is because of 
the regulation, not because of the meaning of ‘marriage’. And this regulation itself is contingent; it 
can be removed, and has been removed in some states. This does not mean ‘marriage’ has changed 
its meaning. It means the same institution is differently regulated. Falling back on claims like 
‘Marriage is a union between one man and one woman’ will not help the defender of the argument 
from meaning. For the ‘is’ need not be definitional, but may merely report a regulation – as in 
‘Football is a game played by men at the professional level’, said in a society where professional 
football has historically been available to men only. 
Thus we see no reason to believe the argument that extending marriage to partners of the same sex 
induces a change of meaning. But there is an additional reason to reject the argument from 
meaning, which is that even if we were to accept that the definition of ‘marriage’ is changed, this is 
no argument against same-sex marriage unless that change of meaning is a bad thing. Definition by 
itself carries no weight with respect to what should be done. Rather, reasons for defining ‘marriage’ 
one way rather than another carry weight. As Elizabeth Brake notes (Brake 2012), the question of 
how ‘marriage’ is defined at some time is different from the normative question of how it should be 
defined. 
The reasons for taking marriage to be a union between a man and a woman – for example, that it 
allows the couple to express commitment, be recognised as sharing responsibilities, be a family unit, 
and so on – are really reasons for taking marriage to be a union between two persons, whatever 
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their sex. So if the limitation to people of opposite sexes was ever part of the definition of ‘marriage’, 
we say that shows that the old definition was only partially successful in capturing what we take to 
be important in marriage. For the old definition overlooks the fact that same-sex couples also have 
the attitudes to one another, and to their future, for which marriage is designed. In that case, we 
should take the opportunity to replace the old definition with one which is better fit for purpose. 
Thus even if marriage were previously defined in a way which excludes same-sex couples – which, as 
we have argued, is dubious – we see no good reason to resist changing that meaning. The defender 
of the argument from meaning might try to provide such reasons, e.g. by saying that the change of 
meaning rids us of a concept which is historically embedded, and that this is some kind of loss to 
culture. But, first, this loss (if it is one) is well-compensated by the gain to culture of a new concept, 
one which will become historically embedded in its turn. Second, this new concept better reflects 
the fact that our cultural understanding of marriage is as something affording the opportunity to 
express commitment, share responsibilities, develop familial relations (economic, emotional, or 
otherwise), and various other such things to which the sex of the partners is irrelevant. Third, the 
‘new’ concept (if it is a new one) is informed by, and historically and culturally continuous with, the 
old definition of marriage. Thus the cultural importance of the old version of marriage is not 
undermined by moving to the new version. 
We have argued that making marriage available to couples of the same sex does not change the 
meaning of ‘marriage’. But even if it did, this would be no reason to resist same-sex marriage. Either 
way, the argument from meaning provides no defensible reason for anyone, including 
representatives of religions, to oppose same-sex marriage, nor to decline to perform same-sex 
marriage ceremonies. 
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5. Consequences for state legislation on marriage in religious contexts 
We have seen reasons to reject arguments against same-sex marriage. Given that the arguments are 
poor, what response should the state give to those individuals who refuse to marry same-sex 
couples? Given our discussion, it might be thought that the right response is that individuals who 
perform marriages in religious contexts should not have the option of declining to marry same-sex 
couples on the basis of their sex, any more than should individuals who perform marriages in the 
civil context. 
But this is not so. The better course of action is still, we suggest, to allow individuals who perform 
religious marriages the option of declining to marry same-sex couples. For what is important in this 
context is not whether the arguments we have given are sound (which we think they are) but 
whether they are believed to be sound (which we fear they will not be by some of those in a position 
to perform religious marriages). 
Our argument here is not that the right to freedom of expression of belief trumps other 
considerations. Neither is it that supporting freedom of expression requires accommodating the 
expression of beliefs which are ill-supported. Our argument rests instead on the nature of marriage 
in particular. Marriage ceremonies require those involved to be sincere. The ceremonies are 
interpersonal, and one of the persons involved is the one who performs the marriage. The 
expectation of a marriage ceremony is that the person who marries the couple has certain attitudes 
towards their marriage; he or she supports it, and endorses the couple’s relationship. This 
interpersonal endorsement is the basis on which the individual who performs the marriage makes 
their legal endorsement available to the couple. 
Those who cannot bring themselves to believe our conclusions in §§2-4 (for whatever reason) could 
not sincerely perform same-sex marriages. Forcing such individuals to perform marriages defeats the 
26 
 
objective. Since sincerity is crucial to the ceremonies which equal marriage aims to make available to 
all, nothing is gained by offering same-sex couples the opportunity of insincere ceremonies. 
For this reason, the case of marriage should be distinguished from other equal opportunities cases. 
Consider an hotelier who refuses a room to a couple because they are of the same sex, and is thus 
subject to legal sanctions. The hotelier acts on a mistaken belief that the relationship is illegitimate. 
But this mistaken belief has no bearing on whether he or she can provide the service requested. 
Sincere endorsement of a couple’s relationship is irrelevant to the provision of an hotel service to 
them. Marriage requires special treatment, because it is an institution in which the sincerity of the 
person providing the service is crucial, and is assumed. A mistaken belief that a same-sex couple’s 
relationship is illegitimate means this sincerity is missing. Thus the person who has the belief cannot 
provide the requisite service demanded by the institution of marriage. 
Given this, the most appropriate response for the state to give to religious opposition to same-sex 
marriage is to allow individuals who perform religious marriages the option of declining to marry 
same-sex couples. Those who do decline should not be subject to legal penalties, insofar as they are 
declining to provide a service they are not able to provide. 
In this way, the state’s strategy can also respect the right to equality of opportunity for couples 
regardless of the sex of the partners. There is equal opportunity to marry, where marriage can be 
performed. Consider the case where an individual has the authority to marry opposite-sex couples 
but refuses to marry a particular opposite-sex couple on the grounds that they think features of the 
relationship make the couple unsuitable for marriage. In these cases, the individual’s participation in 
the ceremony would be insincere. That the individual is thereby incapable of providing the service 
requested means that failing to provide it is not a violation of the couple’s right to equal 
opportunity. Likewise, some individuals have the authority to marry opposite-sex couples but, 
because of their own beliefs, are not in a position where it is possible for them to marry any same-
sex couple. For such an individual to refuse to marry a same-sex couple would not count as a 
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violation of rights, insofar as that individual, again, simply does not have the capability to marry the 
couple. (Contrast with the hotelier, who is capable of providing a room so long as one is available.) 
In sum, a state which allows secular marriage between same-sex partners should not attempt to 
enforce the provision of same-sex religious marriage ceremonies by individuals who refuse to 
perform such ceremonies. Neither should it impose sanctions for such refusals. But the reason is not 
that any argument for opposing same-sex marriage is a good one. The reason is that some 
individuals and institutions mistakenly endorse bad arguments. This mistake means that certain 
individuals do not meet the condition of sincerity necessary for performing a marriage.6 
For the state to expect or require same-sex marriages to be performed under circumstances of 
insincerity would be inappropriate, and a misunderstanding of marriage. It would only obscure what 
is demanded of the state by the right of persons to marry someone of their own sex. 
 
  
                                                          
6
 Casting the discussion in terms of sincerity also sheds light on the tensions within institutions such as the 
Church of England. In deliberately remaining exempt from the legal possibility of marrying same-sex couples, 
the Church of England effectively holds that none of its representatives are able to sincerely marry a couple of 
the same sex whilst also representing that particular religious institution. Those representatives who know 
they could sincerely marry a same-sex couple are frustrated by this. 
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